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5.1 Introduction
Germans retire early. Average retirement age is about fifty-nine-and-
one-half years, half a year younger than the earliest eligibility age for
old-age pensions and more than five years younger than the “normal” re-
tirement age in Germany. Early retirement is a well-appreciated social
achievement among Germans, but it is costly. Since life expectancy at age
sixty is about seventeen years, a year of early retirement corresponds to
more than 5 percent of pension expenditures.
This paper is part of a multistage research project on the causes for and
the eﬀects of early retirement.1 Its significance stems from the mounting
strain on the German public pension system. The German public pension
or, as it is known in German, “public retirement insurance,” was the first
formal pension system when it was installed over one hundred years ago
and has been a model for many social security systems in the world. It has
been very successful in providing a high and reliable level of retirement in-
come over the past one hundred years. It has survived, although under se-
vere modifications, through World Wars I and II, the Great Depression,
and, most recently, the German unification.
However, times have changed. According to recent polls, most young
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1. See the country chapters in Gruber and Wise (1999) for the first stage.
people do not believe that they will receive a pension that will suﬃce for
their old-age consumption, and the number of employees that are using the
few existing loopholes to escape the otherwise mandatory retirement in-
surance system has increased dramatically. Adding to this nervousness,
Germany has experienced two major pension reforms in 1992 and 2001,
each of them dubbed “century reforms,” and a constant flurry of minor
changes between 1992 and 2001. The German public pension model is un-
der siege, and there appear to be two main culprits for this: negative incen-
tive eﬀects of the system, among them the incentives to retire early that
have reduced the number of contributors and increased the number of ben-
eficiaries (the “system-dependency ratio”) since 1972, and the aging popu-
lation, which will rather dramatically increase the system-dependency ra-
tio beginning in 2015 and onward.
This paper is not the forum in which to discuss population aging and its
implications on the pension system.2 Rather, we focus on the incentive
eﬀects to retire early. Figure 5.1 depicts the evolution of average retirement
age among German men from 1960 through 1998, once disaggregated by
old-age pensions and disability pensions, and once total.
The most obvious feature is the sudden change after 1972, when the re-
tirement age drops sharply for both old-age and disability pensions. Within
a few years, the average retirement age for old-age pensions dropped by
about three years and has then stabilized. For disability pensions, we see a
steady decline since 1972 that has not stopped yet. Composition eﬀects—
mainly caused by the tighter disability rules—have led to a consolidation
of the total retirement age at about fifty-nine-and-one-half years.
The year 1972 marks the first major pension reform after the current
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension system was installed in 1957. This
reform introduced a “flexible” retirement age without actuarial adjust-
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2. See Börsch-Supan (1998, 2000a) and Schnabel (1998) for descriptions of the problems,
and Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and Börsch-Supan (2001a) for concrete reform proposals.
Fig. 5.1 Average age at first receipt of public pensions, 1960–1998
Source: VDR (1999), male workers only.
ments of pension benefits. Without going further into details—see Börsch-
Supan and Schnabel (1998) for a more detailed description and analysis—
figure 5.1 appears to be prima facie evidence for the incentives which pen-
sion rules create to retire early.3
Several formal econometric analyses based on micro-data have studied
the incentive eﬀects of the nonactuarial adjustment on early retirement
(Börsch-Supan 1992; Schmidt 1995; Siddiqui 1997; and Börsch-Supan
2000c, 2001b). These studies employ variants of the micro-econometric
option value analysis developed by Stock and Wise (1990). Börsch-Supan
(2000c) derives from the estimates that the 1992 reform will increase the
average retirement age only by about half a year and will reduce retirement
before age sixty from 32 percent to about 28 percent, while a switch to a
system with actuarially fair adjustment factors would shift the retirement
age by about two years. Indeed, these estimates are well in line with the
drop illustrated in figure 5.1. Börsch-Supan (2001b) shows that, in eﬀect,
these estimates are robust even when much more sophisticated specifica-
tions are applied.
This paper builds on these econometric analyses. Its main purpose is to
provide further econometric evidence for the strength of the incentive
eﬀects to retire early, based on micro-data. It adds to the existing literature
in at least four respects. First, this paper uses definitions and specifications
that are comparable to the other countries in this volume. Second, the pa-
per extends the comprehensive treatment of retirement as an option with
several pathways in Börsch-Supan (2001b) beyond the standard old-age
and disability pension. Third, the paper exploits as much of the sample
variation as possible; specifically, we include civil servants in our estima-
tions. Fourth and finally, we apply a “family approach” to retirement op-
tions and compute the joint incentives for husband and spouse.4
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 describe the in-
stitutional background for private-sector and civil servants’ pensions. Sec-
tion 5.4 presents data and variable specifications, section 5.5 contains our
estimation results; section 5.6 explores what these estimates mean, simu-
lates a set of pension reform steps and concludes.
5.2 Private-Sector Pensions
In this section we describe the German public retirement insurance
(Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung or GRV), which covers about 85 percent of
the German workforce. Most of these are private-sector workers, but the
GRV also includes those public-sector workers who are not civil servants.
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3. A competing explanation is that labor demand eﬀects are due to rising unemployment.
See Riphahn and Schmidt (1995) and Börsch-Supan (2000c), who show that there is no evi-
dence in favor of this.
4. See Coile (1999) for the significance of this extension.
Civil servants, about 7 percent of the workforce, have their own pension
system, described in section 5.3. The self-employed, about 9 percent of the
work force, are mainly self-insured although some of them also participate
in the public retirement insurance system. For the average worker, occupa-
tional pensions do not play a major role in the German system of old-age
provision, neither do individual retirement accounts, but there are impor-
tant exceptions from this general picture. Broadly speaking, the German
system is a monolith.
The following descriptions focus on the institutional rules that applied
during our sample period 1984–1997 (dubbed “1972 legislation,” although
there have been several administrative adjustments since 1972). There have
been two major pension reforms in 1992 and 2001. At several places, no-
tably the last subsection, we briefly sketch their implications. These re-
forms, however, did not aﬀect the persons in our sample.
5.2.1 Coverage and Contributions
The German PAYG public pension system features a very broad manda-
tory coverage of workers. Only the self-employed and, until 1998, workers
with earnings below the oﬃcial minimum-earnings threshold (Gering-
fügigkeitsgrenze, which is 15 percent of average monthly gross wage; below
this threshold are about 5.6 percent of all workers) are not subject to
mandatory coverage.
Roughly 70 percent of the budget of the German public retirement in-
surance is financed by contributions that are administrated like a payroll
tax, levied equally on employees and employers. Total contributions in
2000 are 19.3 percent of the first DM 8,600 of monthly gross income (the
upper-earnings threshold, Beitragsbemessungsgrenze, is about 180 percent
of average monthly gross wage).5 Technically, contributions are split evenly
between employees and employers. While the contribution rate has been
fairly stable since 1970, the upper-earnings threshold has been used as a fi-
nancing instrument. It is anchored to the average wage and has increased
considerably faster than inflation.
Private-sector pension benefits are essentially tax free. Pension benefici-
aries do not pay contributions to the pension system or to unemployment
insurance. However, pensioners have to pay the equivalent of the employ-
ees’ contribution to the mandatory medical insurance. The equivalent of
the employers’ contribution to health insurance is paid by the pension
system.
The remaining approximately 30 percent of the social security budget
are financed by earmarked indirect taxes (a fixed fraction of the value-
added tax and the new “eco-tax” on fossil fuel) and a subsidy from the fed-
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5. This is for West Germany only; it is DM 7,200 in East Germany. One DM has a pur-
chasing power of approximately $0.50.
eral government. The subsidy is also used to fine-tune the PAYG budget
constraint, which has a minimal reserve of one month worth of benefits.
5.2.2 Benefit Types
The German public retirement insurance provides old-age pensions
for workers aged sixty and older; disability benefits for workers below age
sixty, which are converted to old-age pensions at age sixty-five at the latest;
and survivor benefits for spouses and children. In addition, preretirement
(i.e., retirement before age sixty) is possible through several mechanisms
using the public transfer system, mainly unemployment compensation. We
begin by describing old-age pensions.
5.2.3 Eligibility for Benefits and Retirement Age for Old-Age Pensions
Eligibility for benefits and the minimum retirement age depend on which
type of pension the worker chooses. The German public retirement insur-
ance distinguishes five types of old-age pensions, corresponding to normal
retirement and four types of early retirement.
This complex system was introduced by the 1972 social security reform.
One of the key provisions was the introduction of flexible retirement after
age sixty-three with full benefits for workers with a long service history. In
addition, retirement at age sixty with full benefits is possible for women,
unemployed, and older disabled workers. Older disabled workers refers to
those workers who cannot be appropriately employed for health or labor
market reasons and are age sixty or older. There are three possible ways to
claim old-age disability benefits. One has to either (a) be at least 50 percent
physically disabled; (b) pass a strict earnings test; or (c) pass a much weaker
earnings test. The strict earnings test is passed if the earnings capacity is
reduced below the minimum-earnings threshold for any reasonable occu-
pation (about 15 percent of average gross wage; erwerbsunfähig or EU). The
weaker earnings test is passed when no vacancies for the worker’s specific
job description are available, and the worker has to face an earnings loss of
at least 50 percent when changing to a diﬀerent job (berufsunfähig or BU).
As opposed to the disability insurance for workers below age sixty (see later
discussion), full benefits are paid in all three cases.
Figure 5.2 shows the uptake of the various pathways,6 including the
disability pathway described below (adding up to 100 percent on the verti-
cal axis) and their changes over time (marked on the horizontal axis), mostly
in response to reforms, benefit adjustments, and administrative rule
changes, particularly the tightening of the disability screening process.
This figure shows the multitude of possible pathways. A major undertak-
ing of this paper is to take account of this diversity.
According to the 1992 social security reform and its subsequent modifi-
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cations, the age limit for types of early retirement will gradually be raised to
age sixty-five. These changes will be fully be phased in by the year 2004. The
only distinguishing feature of types B and C of “early retirement” will then
be the possibility to retire up to five years earlier than age sixty-five if a suﬃ-
cient number of service years (currently thirty-five years) has been accumu-
lated. As opposed to the pre-1992 regulations, benefits will be adjusted to a
retirement age below age sixty-five in a fashion that will be described below.
5.2.4 Benefits
Benefits are strictly work related. The German system does not have
benefits for spouses, like in the United States.7 Benefits are computed on a
lifetime basis and adjusted according to the type of pension and retirement
age. They are the product of four elements: (a) the employee’s relative-
earnings position; (b) the years of service life; (c) adjustment factors for
pension type and (since the 1992 reform) retirement age; and (d) the aver-
age pension. The first three factors make up the personal pension base,
while the fourth factor determines the income distribution between work-
ers and pensioners in general.
The employee’s relative-contribution position is computed by averaging
their annual relative-contribution positions over the entire earnings his-
tory. In each year, the relative-contribution position is expressed as a mul-
tiple of the average annual contribution (roughly speaking, the relative-
income position). A first element of redistribution was introduced in 1972,
when this multiple could not fall below 75 percent for contributions before
1972, provided a worker had a service life of at least thirty-five years. A
similar rule was introduced in the 1992 reform: For contributions between
1973 and 1992, multiples below 75 percent are multiplied by 1.5 up to the
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Fig. 5.2 Pathways to retirement, 1960–1995: Males
Source: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999).
7. There are, of course, survivor benefits.
maximum of 75 percent, eﬀectively reducing the redistribution for workers
with income positions below 50 percent.
Years of service life are years of active contributions plus years of con-
tribution on behalf of the employee and years that are counted as service
years even when no contribution were made at all. These include, for in-
stance, years of unemployment, years of military service, three years for
each child’s education for one of the parents, some allowance for advanced
education, and so forth, thus introducing a second element of redistribu-
tion. The oﬃcial government computations, such as the oﬃcial replace-
ment rate (Rentenniveau), assume a forty-five-year contribution history for
what is deemed a normal earnings history (Eckrentner). In fact, the aver-
age number of years of contributions is about thirty-eight years. Unlike the
United States, there is neither an upper bound of years entering the bene-
fit calculation, nor can workers choose certain years in their earnings his-
tory and drop others.
Since 1992, the average pension is determined by indexation to the aver-
age net labor income. This solved some of the problems that were created
by indexation to gross wages between 1972 and 1992. Nevertheless, wage,
rather than cost of living, indexation makes it impossible to finance the re-
tirement burden by productivity gains.
The average pension has provided a generous benefit level for middle-
income earnings. The net replacement rate for a worker with a forty-five-
year contribution history is 70.5 percent in 1998. For the average worker
with thirty-eight years of contributions, it is reduced in proportion to 59.5
percent. Unlike the United States, the German pension system has very
little redistribution, as is obvious from the benefit computation.8 The low
replacement rates for high incomes result from the upper limit to which
earnings are subject to social security contributions—they correspond to
a proportionally lower eﬀective contribution rate.
Before 1992, adjustment of benefits to retirement age was only implicit
via years of service. Because benefits are proportional to the years of ser-
vice, a worker with fewer years of service will get lower benefits. With a
constant income profile and forty years of service, each year of earlier re-
tirement decreased pension benefits by 2.5 percent and vice versa.
The 1992 social security reform will change this by the year 2004. Age
sixty-five will then act as the pivotal age for benefit computations. For each
year of earlier retirement, up to five years and if the appropriate conditions
in table 5.1 are met, benefits will be reduced by 3.6 percent (in addition to the
eﬀect of fewer service years). The 1992 reform also introduced rewards for
later retirement in a systematic way. For each year of retirement postponed
past the minimum age indicated in table 5.1, the pension is increased by 6
percent in addition to the natural increase by the number of service years.
Table 5.2 displays the retirement-age-specific adjustments for a worker
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who has earnings that remain constant after age sixty. Table 5.2 relates the
income for retirement at age sixty-five (normalized to 100 percent) to the
income for retirement at earlier or later ages, and compares the implicit
adjustments after 1972 with the total adjustments after the 1992 social se-
curity reform is fully phased in. As references, the table also displays the
corresponding adjustments in the United States and actuarially fair ad-
justments at a 3 percent discount rate.9
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Table 5.1 Old-Age Pensions (1972 legislation)
Retirement Years of Additional Earnings
Pension Type Age Service Conditions Test
A: Normal 65 5 No
B: Long service life 63 35 Yes
(“flexible”)
C: Women 60 15 10 of those after age 40 Yes
D: Older disabled 60 35 Loss of at least 50% earnings (Yes)
capability
E: Unemployed 60 15 1.5 to 3 years of unemployment Yes
(has changed several times)
Notes: This legislation was changed in the reform of 1992. It was eﬀective until 1998.
Table 5.2 Adjustment of Public Pensions, by Retirement Age (as percentage of
pension one would obtain if retired at age 65)
Germany United States Actuarially
Age Pre-1992a Post-1992b Pre-1983c Post-1983c Fair e
62 100.0 89.2 80.0 77.8 80.5
63 100.0 92.8 86.7 85.2 86.3
64 100.0 96.4 94.4 92.6 92.8
65 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
66 107.2 106.0 103.0 105.6 108.1
67 114.4 112.0 106.0 111.1 117.2
68 114.4 118.0 109.0 120.0 127.4
69 114.4 124.0 112.0 128.9 139.1
Source: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999).
aGRV 1972–92.
bGRV after 1992 reform has been fully phased in.
cU.S. Social Security (OASDHI) until 1983.
dU.S. Social Security after 1983 reform has been fully phased in.
eEvaluated at a 3 percent discount rate with 1992–1994 mortality risks of West German males
and an annual increase in net pensions of 1 percent.
9. The actuarially fair adjustments equalize the expected social security wealth for a worker
with an earnings history starting at age S equals 20. A higher discount rate yields steeper ad-
justments.
While neither the German nor the U.S. system were actuarially fair prior
to the reforms, the public retirement system in Germany as enacted in 1972
was particularly distortive. There was less economic incentive for Ameri-
cans to retire before age sixty-five and only a small disincentive to retire
later than at age sixty-five after the 1983 reform, while the German social
security system tilted the retirement decision heavily towards the earliest
retirement age applicable. The 1992 reform has diminished but not abol-
ished this incentive eﬀect.
5.2.5 Disability and Survivor Benefits
The contributions to the German retirement insurance also finance dis-
ability benefits to workers of all ages and survivor benefits to spouses and
children. In order to be eligible for disability benefits, a worker must pass
one of the two earnings tests mentioned earlier for the old-age disability
pension. If the stricter earnings test is passed, full benefits are paid (EU);
if only the weaker earnings test is passed and some earnings capability re-
mains, disability pensions before age sixty are only two-thirds of the ap-
plicable old-age pension (BU). In the 1970s and early 1980s, the German
jurisdiction has interpreted both rules very broadly, in particular the
applicability of the first rule. Moreover, jurisdiction also overruled the
earnings test (see following discussion) for earnings during disability re-
tirement. This lead to a share of EU-type disability pensions of more than
90 percent of all disability pensions. Because both rules were used as a de-
vice to keep unemployment rates down, their generous interpretation has
only recently lead to stricter legislation.10
Survivor pensions are 60 percent of the husband’s applicable pension for
spouses that are age forty-five and over or if children are in the household
(große Witwenrente), otherwise they are 25 percent (kleine Witwenrente).
Survivor benefits are a large component of the public pension budget and
of total pension wealth as will be shown in section 5.3. Certain earnings
tests apply if the surviving spouse has her own income, e.g., her own pen-
sion. This is only relevant for a very small (below 10 percent) share of wid-
ows. Male and female survivors are treated symmetrically only recently. As
mentioned before, the German system does not have a married-couple
supplement for spouses of beneficiaries. However, most wives acquire their
own pension by active and passive contribution (mostly years of advanced
education and years of child education).
5.2.6 Preretirement
In addition to benefits through the public pension system, transfer pay-
ments (mainly unemployment compensation) enable what is referred to as
preretirement. Labor force exit before age sixty is frequent: About 45 per-
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cent of all men call themselves retired at age fifty-nine. Only about half of
them retire because of disability; the other 50 percent make use of one of
the many oﬃcial and unoﬃcial preretirement schemes.
Unemployment compensation has been used as preretirement income in
an unoﬃcial scheme that induced very early retirement. Before workers
could enter the public pension system at age sixty, they were paid a nego-
tiable combination of unemployment compensation and a supplement or
severance pay. At age sixty, a pension of type E (see table 5.1) could start.
As the rules of type-E pensions and the duration of unemployment bene-
fits changed, so did the unoﬃcial retirement ages. Age fifty-six was partic-
ularly frequent in West Germany, because unemployment compensation is
paid up to three years for elderly workers; it is followed by the lower un-
employment aid. Earlier retirement ages could be induced by paying the
worker the diﬀerence between the last salary and unemployment compen-
sation for three years and, after these three years, by paying the diﬀerence
(in yearly income) between the last salary and unemployment aid—it all
depended on the “social plan,” in which a firm would negotiate with the
workers before restructuring the work force.
In addition, early retirement at age fifty-eight was made possible in an
oﬃcial preretirement scheme (Vorruhestand ), in which the employer re-
ceived a subsidy from unemployment insurance if a younger employee was
hired. While the first (and unoﬃcial) preretirement scheme was very pop-
ular and a convenient way to overcome the strict German labor laws, few
employers used the oﬃcial second scheme.
5.2.7 Retirement Behavior
The retirement behavior of entrants into the German public retirement
insurance system has been summarized by figures 5.1 and 5.2. For West
Germany, the average retirement age in 1998 was 59.7 years for men and
60.7 years for women. In the East, the average retirement age was 57.9
years for men and 58.2 years for women. The fraction of those who enter
retirement through a disability pension has declined (see figure 5.2) and
was 29 percent in 1998. Only about 20 percent of all entrants used the nor-
mal pathway of an old-age pension at age sixty-five. The most popular re-
tirement age is age sixty.
5.2.8 Pension Reform
During and since our sample period, there have been two major pension
reforms in 1992 and 2001 and many smaller adjustments in-between. The
main changes in the 1992 reform anchored benefits to net, rather than to
gross, wages. This implicitly has reduced benefits since taxes and social se-
curity contributions have increased, reducing net wages, relative to gross
wages. This mechanism is particularly important when the population ag-
ing will speed up. The other important change in 1992 was the introduction
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of adjustments to benefits in some (not all) cases of early retirement and a
change in the normal retirement age for women. (They have been described
in subsection 5.2.4.) They will be fully eﬀective in 2017 and reduce the in-
centives to retire early. However, they are still not actuarially fair even at
very low discount rates.11
The 2001 reform is intended to change the monolithic German system of
old-age provision to a genuine multipillar system. Benefits will gradually
be reduced by about 10 percent, lowering the replacement rate with respect
to the average net earnings from 72 percent in 1997 to 64 percent in 2030.
The eﬀective benefit cuts are even larger since the credit of earnings points
for education and training will be greatly restricted. On the other hand, a
redefinition of the oﬃcial replacement rate minimizes the perception of
these cuts because, defined as such, the new replacement rate will be 67 per-
cent with respect to a smaller net earnings base. The resulting pension gap
of slightly less than 20 percent of the current retirement income is sup-
posed to be filled with occupational and individual pensions. This new pil-
lar is not mandatory, but the required private savings will be subsidized or
tax privileged. The 2001 reform does not change the normal retirement age
or the adjustment factors concerning the early retirement age that provide
the large incentives to retire early, which is the main subject of this paper.
5.3 Public-Sector Pensions
There are two types of workers in the public sector: civil servants and
other public-sector workers. As already mentioned, the latter are part of
the same system as the private-sector workers described in the previous sec-
tion. In addition, they participate in a supplemental system that resembles
occupational pensions elsewhere and raises the pensions of public-sector
workers to the level of civil servants.
Civil servants do not pay explicit contributions for their pensions, as the
other employees in the private- and public-sectors do.12 Instead, the gross
wage for civil servants is lower than the gross wage of other public-sector
employees with a comparable education. Civil servants acquire pension
claims that are very generous compared to workers in the private sector.
5.3.1 Eligibility: Pathways to Retirement for Civil Servants
There are three pathways for civil servants: the standard, the early, and
the disability retirement option. The standard retirement age is sixty-five.
Before 1 July 1997 the early retirement age for civil servants was sixty-two
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12. Civil servants are also exempt from unemployment-insurance contributions since civil
servants have a lifetime job guarantee. The government pays a certain fraction of health ex-
penses of the civil servant and their dependents (ranging from 50 to 80 percent). The rest has
to be covered by private insurance.
and thus one year less than the early retirement age in the social security
system. In 1997, early retirement age was raised to sixty-three. Discount
factors for early retirement are phasing in linearly between the years 1998
and 2003 and will reach 0.3 percentage points per month of early retire-
ment, the same as in the private sector and substantially smaller than ac-
tuarially fair. Since our sample covers the years 1984 to 1997, these changes
of rules do not play a role in our analysis.13
Filing for disability is a third pathway to retirement for civil servants. In
the case of disability, a civil servant receives a pension that is based on their
previous salary. The replacement rate depends on the number of service
years reached before disability retirement and the number of service years
that could potentially have been accumulated up to age sixty. For those
who did not reach the maximum replacement rate before disability, one ad-
ditional year of service raises the replacement rate by only 1/3 percentage
point per year.
5.3.2 Computation of Pensions
The standard pension benefit for civil servants is the product of three
elements: (a) the last gross earnings level; (b) the replacement rate as func-
tion of service years, and (c) the new adjustment factors to early retire-
ment. As described previously, this third component does not aﬀect our
sample persons. There are three crucial diﬀerences between civil servants’
pensions and private-sector benefits. First, the benefit base is gross income,
rather than net income. In turn, civil servants’ pensions are taxed like any
other income. Finally, the benefit base is the last salary rather than the life-
time average.
In the following, we concentrate on describing how the system worked
for the sample period 1984–1997. Benefits are anchored to the earnings in
the last position and then updated annually by the growth rate of the net
earnings of active civil servants. If the last position was reached within the
two years preceding retirement, the pension is based on the previous lower
position. Due to the diﬀerence in the benefit base, gross pensions of civil
servants are approximately 25 percent higher (other things being equal)
than in the private sector.
The maximum replacement rate is 75 percent of gross earnings which is
considerably higher than the oﬃcial replacement rate of the private-sector
system, which is around 70 percent of net earnings. The replacement rate
depends on the years of service. High school and college education, mili-
tary service, and other work in the public sector are also counted as service
years. For retirement after June 1997, the college education credit is limited
to three years.
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13. Very specific rules apply to some civil servants. For example, the regular retirement age
for police oﬃcers is age sixty; for soldiers it is even lower and depends on their rank.
Before 1992, the replacement rate was a nonlinear function of service
years. The replacement rate started at a value of 35 percent for all civil ser-
vants with at least five years of service. For each additional year of service
between the tenth and the twenty-fifth year, the increment was 2 percent-
age points. From the twenty-fifth to the thirty-fifth year the annual incre-
ment was 1 percent. Thus, the maximum replacement rate of 75 percent
was reached with thirty-five service years under the old rule. This is much
more generous than the private-sector replacement rate of 70 percent that
requires forty-five years of service.
For persons retiring after 1 January 1992, the replacement rate grows by
1.88 percentage points for each year of service. Thus, the maximum value
is reached after forty years of service. However, there are transitional mod-
ifications to that simple rule. First, civil servants who reach the standard
retirement age (usually age sixty-five) before 1 January 2002 are not af-
fected at all. Second, for younger civil servants, all claims that have been
acquired before 1992 are conserved. These persons gain 1 additional per-
centage point per year from 1992 onward. All persons who have acquired
twenty-five service years before 1992 have reached 65 percentage points
and also would have gained only 1 additional point per year under the old
rule. Only persons with less than twenty-five service years in 1991 can be
made worse oﬀ by the reform. The new proportional rule only applies if it
generates a higher replacement rate than the transitional rule. Our calcu-
lations of pension wealth use these institutional changes, but only a few
special cases are aﬀected.
The generosity of gross pensions received by civil servants vis-á-vis the
private-sector workers is only partially oﬀset by the preferential tax treat-
ment of private-sector pensions. Since civil servants’ pensions are taxed ac-
cording to the German comprehensive income taxation, the net replace-
ment rates of civil service pension recipients depends on their position in
the highly progressive tax schedule. In general, the net replacement rate,
with respect to the preretirement net earnings, is higher than 75 percent
and thus considerably more generous than in the private sector.
5.3.3 Incentives to Retire
In our sample, most civil servants have reached the maximum replace-
ment rate by the age of fifty-four. Persons who have started to work in the
public sector before the age of twenty-three have reached a replacement rate
of 75 percent, when taking into account the disability rules. This also holds
for civil servants, who—like professors—receive lifetime tenure late in their
life cycle. For those groups, the starting age is usually set at twenty-one. Ad-
ditional years of service beyond the age of fifty-four increase pensions only
if the civil servant is promoted to a position with a higher salary. Retirement
incentives therefore strongly depend on promotion expectations.
For persons who cannot expect to be promoted after age fifty-four, the
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pension accrual is zero or very small. For those who have already reached
the replacement rate of 75 percent, the accrual of the present discounted
pension wealth is negative. Since the replacement rate is 75 percent of the
gross earnings in the last position before retirement, the negative accrual
of postponing retirement by one year is simply 75 percent of the last gross
earnings. This is equivalent to a 75 percent tax on earnings.
For persons who expect to climb another step in the hierarchy, the gross
wage increase is, on average, 10.5 percent. This raises the pension by ap-
proximately 10 percent. In order to cash in the higher pension, the civil ser-
vant has to defer retirement by at least one year.14 In this extreme case the
social security wealth increases 10 percent through the eﬀect of higher pen-
sions and decreases by 5 percent through the eﬀect of pension deferral. In
this extreme case, the pension accrual is positive. If the civil servant has to
wait several years for the next promotion (or for the promotion to have an
eﬀect on pension claims), the accrual of working becomes negative.
The dependency on promotion expectations makes modeling the in-
centive eﬀects for civil servants very hard, since the researcher needs infor-
mation on the career prospects of the respondent. We do not have such in-
formation in our data and must therefore ignore the eﬀect of potential
promotions.
5.3.4 Retirement Behavior
The retirement behavior of civil servants reflects the very generous dis-
ability and early retirement rules. The average retirement age for civil ser-
vants in the year 1993 was age 58.9 and thus about one year lower than in
the private sector (see section 5.2.7). Disability is the most important path-
way to retirement for civil servants—40 percent of those who retired in
the year 1993 used disability retirement. Almost one-third used the early
retirement option at the age of sixty-two. Only about 20 percent of civil ser-
vants retired at the regular retirement age of sixty-five.
5.4 Data and Variable Specification
Our main data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
described subsequently. The remaining subsections are devoted to the vari-
able construction, notably the definition of retirement status, which acts as
our dependent variable, and the incentive variables, which act as our main
explanatory variables. Aggregate information is provided by the German
retirement insurance organization (Verband deutscher Versicherungträger
or VDR), which publishes annual statistics on average earnings, system en-
tries, retirement age, and the like (Rentenversicherung in Zeitreihen), and by
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14. For the higher earnings to take eﬀect on pensions, it is usually required to work several
years after the promotion.
the Labor Ministry (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung;
BMA 1999).
5.4.1 The German Socio-Economic Panel
The GSOEP is an annual panel study of some 6,000 households and
some 15,000 individuals. The data are gathered by the German Institute
for Economic Research (DIW). The GSOEP is a panel survey of private
households. Its design closely corresponds to the U.S. Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics (PSID).15 The GSOEP includes carefully designed house-
hold weights that match the data with the German Mikrozensus. The panel
started in 1984; we use fourteen annual waves through 1997.
In 1997, the GSOEP had four subsamples: (a) West German citizens
(9,000 persons in 1984); (b) Foreign workers from Spain, Italy, Greece,
Turkey, and former Yugoslavia residing in West Germany (3,000 persons
in 1984, oversampled); (c) East German citizens (4,000 persons sampled
from 1991 onward); and (d) Germans who have remigrated (mainly from
Romania and the former Soviet Union; 1,000 persons sampled in 1995).
We draw our working sample from samples (a) and (b) since the labor
supply patterns of East Germans and remigrants are substantially diﬀer-
ent from residents in West Germany so that pooling these samples is not
warranted.16
We constructed a equal-sided unbalanced panel of all persons aged fifty-
five through seventy from subsamples (a) and (b) for whom earnings data
is available.17 This panel includes 2,223 individuals with 14,401 observa-
tions. Average observation time is six-and-one-half years. The panel is left
censored, as we include only persons who have worked at least one year
during our time window in order to reconstruct an earning history. There
is only a little right censoring due to missing interviews. Specifically, for-
eign workers often leave Germany after retirement. However, since this
aﬀects only a few cases, we did not model this censoring. The sample con-
tains private-sector workers, civil servants and other public-sector work-
ers, and the self-employed.
The GSOEP data provide a detailed account of income and employment
status. Since the GSOEP performs personal interviews with each member
aged seventeen and older in the household, we have the same information
on husbands and spouses. The personal information includes labor market
status, gross and net income, hours worked, education, and marital status
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15. Burkhauser (1991) provides an English-language description, code books, and links to
an internationally accessible GSOEP version. Börsch-Supan (2000b) discusses the merits and
limits of the GSOEP data for studies of retirement behavior.
16. Schmähl (1991) provides a narrative of the transition.
17. We excluded East Germany because its retirement patterns are dominated by the tran-
sition problems to a market economy. See Börsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996) for a compar-
ison.
but only a subjective indicator of health (plus disability status, and number
of doctor and hospital visits). The GSOEP also has a very detailed labor
market calendar that provides monthly information on the labor market
status (full-time, part-time, retired, unemployed, and education) and its
corresponding income for each sample person. This detailed information
during the sample period is augmented by a retrospective history of labor
force participation that starts with age fifteen. It carries the annual labor
market status (full-time, part-time, unemployed, out-of-labor force, and so
forth) but has no retrospect earnings information.
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the most common socioe-
conomic variables in our working sample.
5.4.2 Construction of Earnings Histories
Since the benefit formula for private-sector pensions depends on earn-
ings points computed from relative-income positions, and since civil ser-
vants’ pensions depend on the last salary, we do not need a complete earn-
ings history of our sample persons. Information on the earnings position
in each year relative to the aggregate average of that year is suﬃcient. We
have this information for the sample period but not for earlier years. We
therefore estimate the average relative earnings position (EP) using all non-
retired, full- or part-time workers in the sample who have a positive wage.
We fit a fixed-eﬀects model for EP. The fixed eﬀects absorb the constant
covariates (e.g., education, marital status, and race). All aggregate year-
specific covariates drop out since we estimate the relative earnings posi-
tion. This procedure makes the most eﬃcient use of our earnings data.
In the forward projection, we need a forecast of the absolute earnings
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
Valid Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Age 14,401 59.77 4.88 53 70
Health 14,401 8.09 3.05 0 10
Married 14,401 86% 34% 0 1
College 14,401 11% 31% 0 1
Skilled 14,401 86% 58% 0 2
Homeowner 14,398 52% 50% 0 1
No wealth 14,312 11% 31% 0 1
Financial assets 14,401 22% 42% 0 1
Experience 14,401 450.29 96.01 0 646
Former self-employed 14,401 9% 29% 0 1
Former civil servant 14,359 8% 27% 0 1
Children in household 14,401 33% 47% 0 1
Source: GSOEP, working sample of males, 1984–97 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/
gsoep).
level. In retrospect, we recover this by multiplying EP, the average relative
earnings position, with the aggregate level of earnings, which we take from
the VDR statistics. For future years, we assume a 1 percent real wage
growth, corresponding to the average over the last twenty-five years.
5.4.3 Definition of Retirement Status
The definition of the retirement status is problematic. Retirement defi-
nitions commonly employed in the literature include the retirement status
self-reported by the respondent. Few work hours or the receipt of retire-
ment benefits are among other definitions. In many countries (e.g., the
United States; see Rust 1990), these definitions do not coincide for a large
fraction of old-age workers. The problem is somewhat less severe in Ger-
many, although there are some diﬀerences such as the more distinct spikes
at the legal ages (described in table 5.1), as can be seen from figure 5.3.
The persons in our sample appear to have a very general notion of re-
tirement since, when asked about their labor market status, they consider
the receipt of benefits from preretirement schemes as well as from the for-
mal retirement programs as retirement. It seems as if they consider diﬀer-
ent programs as close substitutes. For instance, persons who receive sever-
ance pay from their former employers plus unemployment compensation
generally claim to be retired. Moreover, our sample persons rarely report
significant hours worked after the receipt of pension benefits.
Our first measure of retirement (definition I) is thus the self-assessment
as retired, and our results presented below are based on this definition. One
additional reason for treating this as retirement is the fact that, after giving
up the career job, there is no choice left. For instance, persons in preretire-
ment schemes are automatically shifted from unemployment benefits to
old-age pensions of type E (see table 5.1) at age sixty.
We also tried out other definitions.18 For instance, we know whether or
not persons received formal pension benefits. A definition based on this ex-
cludes some forms of early retirement (definition II). We then add persons
to definition I who receive formal pensions but do not consider themselves
as being retired (e.g., many of the self-employed). This definition III (the
joint set of I and II) is the broadest definition.
5.4.4 Handling of Multiple Retirement Programs
At least theoretically, a worker at age fifty-five has the choice between
three retirement programs:
• Old-age pensions starting at age sixty,
• Disability pensions, and
• Preretirement schemes.
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18. Using one of the other measures does not change the qualitative results. We find that
the first measure of retirement works best.
F
ig
. 5
.3
R
et
ir
em
en
t s
ta
tu
s 
by
 a
lt
er
na
tiv
e 
de
fin
it
io
ns
S
ou
rc
e:
G
SO
E
P,
 w
or
ki
ng
 s
am
pl
e 
of
 m
al
es
, 1
98
4–
19
97
 (a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.d
iw
-b
er
lin
.d
e/
gs
oe
p)
.
The set of choices is actually larger because some of these programs have
several branch programs (e.g., within old-age pensions there are unem-
ployment, long-service life, and so on), as depicted in figure 5.2. We refer
to these choices as pathways, as we have done in figure 5.2. It is important
to notice that all of these pathways pay the same benefit once a person is
eligible.19
In practice, there is no free choice since most of these pathways are sub-
ject to eligibility criteria. Among those, we distinguish between “strict eli-
gibility rules” that are tied to objective variables, such as age, gender, and
previous contribution history, and “soft eligibility rules” that are subject to
discretionary decisions, notably the determination of a workers’ disability
status.20
In the construction of social security wealth and the incentive variables
(see later discussion), we need to compute expected pension benefits, which
depend on the choice of pathway. We used two methods. The first method
considers only strict eligibility, implicitly assuming that every individual
who wants to obtain a disability pension will eventually be granted one.
Hence, expected benefits at a given age are zero if the person is not eligible
to any of the pathways, otherwise the (common) benefit for that given age
is assumed. For example, those self-employed who pay voluntary contri-
butions are only eligible for early retirement—namely disability—if they
have contributed continuously since 1984 (the date of a major reform of
voluntary participation), otherwise they can retire at the age of sixty-three
at the earliest.21 In the latter case, the pension will be zero for all retirement
ages below sixty-three.
The second method weights the benefits by its observed frequency. Let’s
suppose, the observed frequency of disability status at age fifty-nine is 33
percent, and the sample person is not eligible for any other pathway at that
age. Then expected benefits at age fifty-nine for this person will be a third
of the (common) benefit level. Börsch-Supan (2001b) explores the sensi-
tivity of estimation results to these two methods, and provides an instru-
mental-variable interpretation of the second method. This second method
is our method of choice and the only one reported in this paper.
5.4.5 Construction of Social Security Wealth
A key statistic to measure the incentives to retire early is the change in
the net present value of all future benefits when retirement is postponed. In
a slight misuse of terminology, we call the net present value of all future
benefits “social security wealth” (SSW) for both private-sector and civil
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19. Strictly speaking, preretirement programs can have any benefit level because they are
negotiated between workers and employers. In practice, however, the outcome of these nego-
tiations is guided by the public insurance benefits.
20. Disability depends on health as well as labor market characteristics.
21. See Schnabel (1999) for details.
servants’ pensions. If SSW declines because the increase in the annual pen-
sion due to postponement of retirement is not large enough to oﬀset the
shorter time of pension receipt, workers have a financial incentive to retire
earlier.
We define SSW as the expected present discounted value of benefits
(YRET) minus applicable contributions that are levied on gross earnings
(c  YLAB). Seen from the perspective of a worker who is S years old and
plans to retire at age R, SSW is
SSWS (R )  ∑

tR
YRETt (R)  at  
tS  ∑
R1
tS
c  YLABt  at  
tS.
SSW: net present discounted value of retirement benefits
S: planning age
R: retirement age
YLABt: gross labor income at age t
YRETt (R ): net pension income at age t for retirement at age R
ct : contribution rate to pension system at age t
at : probability to survive at least until age t given survival until age S
: discount factor  1/(1  r)
We choose the usual discount rate of 3 percent. Conditional survival
probabilities are computed from the standard life tables of the German Bu-
reau of the Census (Statistisches Bundesamt), and SSW depends also on
the joint survival probabilities of spouses through survivor pensions. We
assume independence of survival of spouses to compute the joint proba-
bility.
We also have to predict future contribution rates and pensions. In or-
der to obtain consistent policy simulations, they are simulated using the
macro-economic pension model underlying Börsch-Supan (1995). This in-
ternal consistency is important. Assume a policy proposal that reduces the
replacement rate by 20 percent. This immediately lowers the contribution
rates by 20 percent if the system is PAYG and financed through contribu-
tions. The eﬀect on SSW is ambiguous and varies by cohort.
Table 5.4 shows the average SSW in our sample and its change for each
individual—the accrual of social security when retirement is postponed by
one year. Note that the averages in the right-side panel are not the first
diﬀerences of the average SSW in the left-side panel since the aggregate fig-
ures relate to diﬀerent individuals in our unbalanced panel.
5.4.6 Specification of Incentive Variables
We computed five diﬀerent incentives measures.
• ACCRUAL: the accrual of SSW if retirement is postponed by one year
• ACCRUALRATE: the accrual divided by the level of SSW
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• TAXRATE: the accrual divided by the (potential) gross earnings dur-
ing the year of postponement
• PEAKVAL: the maximum of future SSW over all possible retirement
ages minus the SSW for immediate retirement
• OPTVAL: the option value of postponing retirement by one year
The pension-wealth accrual function, a function of the retirement age R,
is the change in SSW when retirement is postponed from age R – 1 to age
R. We have seen this first incentive variable already in table 5.4. We convert
this variable into a rate by defining
ACCRS (R )  ,
which is displayed in table 5.5. The lack of actuarial fairness of the German
public pension system creates a negative accrual of pension wealth be-
tween 5 and 8 percent during the early retirement window when retirement
is postponed by one year. The average loss in our sample is about DM
10,000 (roughly US$5,000 at purchasing power parity).
A negative accrual can be interpreted as a tax on further labor force par-
ticipation. We therefore compute as an implicit tax rate the ratio of the
(negative) SSW accrual to the gross wage (YLAB) that workers would earn
if they postponed retirement to age R.
SSWS (R )  SSWS (R  1)

SSWS (R  1)
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Table 5.4 Social Security Wealth and Its Accrual
SSW Accrual
Age Mean SD N Mean SD N
54 167.209 82.603 913 –10.084 5.083 913
55 169.280 80.628 948 –10.494 5.175 948
56 166.391 80.242 930 –8.327 4.356 930
57 168.211 80.550 885 –8.730 4.651 885
58 171.161 81.672 812 –8.991 4.612 812
59 170.002 81.828 736 –9.360 4.713 736
60 172.426 80.792 656 –8.565 4.565 656
61 175.892 81.324 572 –8.929 4.690 572
62 182.616 77.848 507 –9.064 4.780 507
63 191.603 75.784 434 –10.997 4.302 434
64 194.370 76.811 375 –11.643 4.512 375
65 194.654 76.697 325 –12.149 4.652 325
66 197.866 76.820 275 –12.855 4.846 275
67 197.180 76.052 225 –13.374 5.038 225
68 196.372 77.633 182 –13.869 5.330 182
69 196.469 78.187 144 –14.424 5.637 144
Total 175.948 80.691 8919 –9.908 4.995 8919
Note: All figures in € 1995 (€1 has a purchasing power of about US$1.00) SD = standard de-
viation; N = number of observations.
TAXRS (R)  
This implicit tax rate can be rewritten as the product of two terms. The
first term represents the eﬀect of postponing retirement through mortality,
discounting, and the adjustment of benefits to retirement age, while the
second term is the net replacement rate.

Y
Y
L
R
A
E
B
T
R
N
R
ET

TAXRS (R)  [aR    (  1)  1]  REPLR
If benefits are actuarially fair in a financial sense,   1  1/aR  , and
the resulting tax rate is zero. This is not the case in Germany (see table 5.5).
It shows that the early retirement incentives in Germany have been strong.
The tax rate at age sixty was about 30 percent, and increased with the
retirement age to exceed 40 percent at age sixty-five. These numbers refer
to the pre-1992 legislation applicable to our sample. Today’s implicit tax
rates are about half of those in table 5.5 (see Börsch-Supan and Schnabel
1999).
These first three measures of one-year accrual only account for the im-
mediate benefit to working an additional year. But an additional year of
work also sustains the option of retiring at an even later date. The value of
this choice can be important if there are large nonlinearities in the accrual
SSWS (R)  SSWS (R  1)

YLABR
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Table 5.5 Accrual Rates and Implicit Tax Rates
Accrual Rate Implicit Tax Rate
Age Mean (%) SD (%) N Mean (%) SD (%) N
54 –7.7 15.1 885 34.4 13.5 886
55 –8.3 16.6 927 35.7 13.0 923
56 –6.9 14.4 904 28.6 11.6 908
57 –7.7 17.3 862 29.6 11.8 866
58 –7.2 14.3 788 30.4 11.4 798
59 –8.2 18.2 711 31.9 11.6 726
60 –8.0 20.3 637 29.4 11.4 648
61 –7.6 20.2 553 30.6 11.0 568
62 –5.0 1.7 493 31.8 11.7 502
63 –5.8 0.4 432 37.9 6.8 431
64 –6.0 0.4 374 40.1 7.0 374
65 –6.3 0.4 325 42.2 6.6 325
66 –6.5 0.5 275 44.5 6.7 275
67 –6.8 0.5 225 47.0 7.0 225
68 –7.1 0.5 182 49.6 7.5 182
69 –7.4 0.5 144 51.8 7.1 143
Total –7.2 14.3 8717 34.1 12.4 8780
Note: SD = standard deviation; N = number of observations.
profile. For example, if there is a small negative accrual at age fifty-nine, but
a large positive accrual at age sixty, it would be misleading to say that the
system induces retirement at age fifty-nine; the disincentive to work at that
age is dominated by incentives to work at age sixty.
One way of capturing this possibility is to use the “peak value” calcula-
tion suggested by Coile and Gruber (1999). Rather than taking the diﬀer-
ence between SSW today and next year, peak value takes the diﬀerence be-
tween SSW today and in the year in which the expected value of SSW is
maximized:
PEAKVALS (R)  SSWS (R)  max
T 	R
[SSWS(T )].
This measure therefore captures the tradeoﬀ between retiring today and
working until a year with a much higher SSW. In years beyond the year in
which SSW peaks, this calculation collapses to the simple one-year accrual
variable. In fact, PEAKVAL turns out to be virtually identical to AC-
CRUAL since pension accrual is negative in most cases for the whole se-
quence of retirement ages (see the averages in table 5.6).
All these measures include the financial aspects of the retirement deci-
sion only. Alternatively, one might consider the consumption utility of net
earnings and pension benefits and also account for the utility aspects of the
labor-for-leisure trade-oﬀ. To this end, we employ as the fifth and final in-
centive variable the option value to postpone retirement (Stock and Wise
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Table 5.6 Peak Value and Option Value
Peak Value Option Value
Age Mean SD N Mean SD N
54 –10.084 5.085 913 66.414 111.233 913
55 –10.493 5.176 948 61.179 101.163 948
56 –8.326 4.357 930 59.015 93.312 930
57 –8.728 4.652 885 55.770 118.974 885
58 –8.986 4.622 812 49.709 115.357 812
59 –9.320 4.764 736 42.628 98.487 736
60 –8.531 4.612 656 33.888 51.254 656
61 –8.904 4.717 572 25.936 44.513 572
62 –9.064 4.780 507 15.646 33.281 507
63 –10.997 4.302 434 5.900 16.255 434
64 –11.643 4.512 375 2.806 12.175 375
65 –12.149 4.652 325 0.428 7.975 325
66 –12.855 4.846 275 –1.341 6.873 275
67 –13.374 5.038 225 –3.188 5.724 225
68 –13.869 5.330 182 –4.984 4.855 182
69 –14.424 5.637 144 –6.642 4.029 144
Total –9.900 5.007 8919 38.167 87.540 8919
Note: See table 5.4.
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Fig. 5.4 Grid search for three estimation variants
Source: Authors’ estimates based on GSOEP panel of males (available at http://www.
diw-berlin.de/gsoep). See text for explanation of legend.
1990). This value expresses for each retirement age the trade-oﬀ between
retiring now (resulting in a stream of utility that depends on this retirement
age) and keeping all options open for some later retirement date (with as-
sociated streams of utility for all possible later retirement ages).
Let Vt(R) denote the expected discounted future utility at age t if the
worker retires at age R, specified as follows:
Vt (R)  ∑
R1
st
u (YLABs
NET)  as  
st  
 ∑

sR
u(YRETs (R))  as 
st.
YLABs
NET  after-tax labor income at age s, s  t . . . R – 1
YRETs (R)  pension income at age s, s 	 R
R  retirement age

  marginal utility of leisure (to be estimated)
a  probability to survive at least until age s
  discount factor  1/(1 r)
Utility from consumption is represented by an isoelastic utility function
in after-tax income, u(Y )  Y . (Remember that pension income in Ger-
many is eﬀectively untaxed.) To capture utility from leisure, utility during
retirement is weighted by 
 	 1, where 1/
 is the marginal disutility of work.
We employed a grid search for the parameter 
, applied to three specifi-
cations (see figure 5.4). The parameter gets smaller as more covariates are
used: It is larger than 4 if only a second-order age polynomial is included
(plus option value), 2.8 if initial SSW is added, and 2.5 if a large set of re-
gressors including a full set of age dummies is added (see table 5.7).
The option value for a specific age is defined as the diﬀerence between
the maximum attainable consumption utility of the worker postpones re-
tirement to some later year minus the utility of consumption that the
worker can aﬀord if the worker would retire now. Let R∗(t) denote the op-
timal retirement age if the worker postpones retirement past age t, that
is, max(Vt (r)) for r 	 t. With this notation, the option value is
G(t)  Vt (R∗(t))  Vt (t).
Since a worker is likely to retire as soon as the utility of the option to
postpone retirement becomes smaller than the utility of retiring now, re-
tirement probabilities should depend negatively on the option value.
The option value captures the economic incentives created by the
pension system and the labor market because the retirement income
YRETs(R) depends on retirement age according to the adjustment factors
and on previous labor income by the benefit rules summarized in sections
5.2 and 5.3. The option value is also closely linked to the pension accrual.
This is most easily seen in a simple two-period comparison and for  equals
1. In this crude approximation, a worker of age R in the first period will re-
tire early if

  W(R) 	 YLABNET  
 W(R  1),
where W(t) denotes the present discounted value of pension benefits when
retiring at age t. Using the definition of TAXR(R), it follows that a worker
will retire in the first period if TAXR(R) 	 1/
. Hence, according to this
crude approximation, the tax rates well above 50 percent exerted by the
current public pension system in Germany will lead to early retirement.
We compute the option value for every person in our sample, using the
applicable pension regulations and the imputed earning histories. The pa-
rameters chosen are a discount rate  of 3 percent, a curvature parameter
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Table 5.7 Definitions of Other Explanatory Variables
Age Age of person
Married Marital status: 1 = married, 0 = not married
Health 0 = poor, . . . , 10 = excellent
College 1 = college degree, 0 = else
Medium skilled 1 = medium skilled (only vocational training or high school)
Homeowner 1 = homeowner
No assets 1 = no wealth
Financial assets 1 = owner of financial assets
Exp Work experience
Yhat Estimated labor income
Former self-employed Self-employed before retirement
Former civil servant Civil servant before retirement
Kids Children in household
 of 1.0, and a relative utility parameter 
 of 2.8. Additional private pen-
sion income is ignored because it represents only a very small proportion
of retirement income as described before. Table 5.6 shows the sample aver-
ages.
5.5 Regression Results
The variable to be explained is old-age labor force status. Because Ger-
many has very few part-time employees, we model only two states—fully
in the labor force and fully retired—unlike the competing-risk analysis of
Sueyoshi (1989). We use definition I for retired, based on the self-assessed
labor force status (see section 5.4.3).
In each of the following regressions, our main explanatory variable is
one of the four incentive variables described in the previous section: ac-
crual rate, implicit tax rate, peak value (which is essentially identical to the
accrual of SSW), and option value. The other explanatory variables are the
usual suspects: an array of socioeconomic variables, such as gender, mari-
tal status, wealth (indicator variables of several financial and real-wealth
categories), and a self-assessed health measure ranging from 0 for poor to
10 for excellent health. We do not use the legal disability status as a mea-
sure of health since this is endogenous to the retirement decision. The de-
sire for early retirement may prompt workers to seek disability status, and
frequently the employer helps in this process to alleviate restructuring. Un-
til recently, disability status was granted for labor market reasons without
a link to health.
We link the explanatory variables to the dependent variable by a binary
probit model. This does some injustice to the panel nature of our data and
probably underestimates the true eﬀect (see Börsch-Supan 2001b, who ex-
periments with several specifications of panel probit models with parame-
trized correlation patterns over time). This more complicated models can be
interpreted as partly nonparametric hazard models for multiple spell data,
permitting unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence without impos-
ing a functional form on the duration in a given state, while the simple pro-
bit model ignores these temporal eﬀects.22 We conducted several random-
eﬀect estimates that correct for some of the intertemporal correlations. The
eﬀects of the incentive variables were slightly strengthened, but the results
did not change significantly. Note that our estimation sample includes re-
peated observations of the same person only while this person is employed.
Once the person retires, we assume that this is an absorbing state and in-
clude only the first observation in retirement. Hence, our dependent vari-
able is in fact the probability to retire, given that the sample person has
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22. Flexible-hazard-rate models of retirement have been estimated by Sueyoshi (1989) and
Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), and parametric-hazard-rate models for German data have
been estimated by Schmidt (1995) and Börsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996).
worked during the year before, pt  Prob(retired in t | worked in t – 1). We
then compute the survivor function S(t) conditional on working until the
beginning of our window period (age fifty-three) as the product of (1 – pt )
from age fifty-three to t. The probability of choosing a retirement age a is
then pa  S(a) and the expected retirement age is Σpa  S(a)  a.
Inserting the option value in this type of a regression model is a practi-
cal estimation procedure that can be interpreted as a flexible discrete-time
duration model explaining the timing of retirement entry. It ignores, how-
ever, the structure of the dynamic optimization that underlies the workers
decision regarding when to retire.23 Nevertheless, previous experimenta-
tion has shown that this pragmatic approach generates robust estimates of
the average eﬀects of the incentive variables on retirement, although it is
likely to fail the individual variation as precisely as the true dynamic opti-
mization model.24
Identification of the incentive variables is possible only if we have mean-
ingful variation in these variables. Sources of variation are
• The level of SSW reached at the earliest retirement age, mainly gener-
ated by variation in labor force histories;
• The upper threshold for the social security contributions, mainly gen-
erated by their changes over time and the diﬀerent earnings levels;
• Diﬀerences in the pension rules between single workers and couples;
• Widely varying age diﬀerences between husband and spouse;
• Restricted eligibility of self-employed;
• Restricted eligibility of women with less than fifteen years of service;
• Diﬀerences in the pension formula between private-sector employees
and civil servants;
• Diﬀerences in the ratio between contribution rates and pension bene-
fits across cohorts (younger cohorts have a substantially lower inter-
nal rate of return); and
• Several minor rule changes during our the sample period.
We estimated twenty-four diﬀerent models: We use four diﬀerent incen-
tive variables as our main regressors (accrual rate, tax rate, option value,
and peak value; see section 5.4.6). For each of these incentive variables, we
run probit regressions with three age specifications (linear, quadratic, and
a full set of age dummies) as well as with and without including SSW. We
pool public and private workers, but have separate regressions for males
and females.
We first summarize our main results separately for men and women.
Tables 5.8 and 5.10 report the goodness of fit, and tables 5.9 and 5.11 the im-
pact of the incentive variables, measured as the change in the probability of
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23. The full underlying dynamic programming model has been estimated by Rust and Phe-
lan (1997).
24. See Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992).
Table 5.9 Marginal Eﬀect of Incentive Variables (males)
Accrual Rate Tax Rate
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without 0.0001396 0.0001381 0.0001356 –0.08456341 –0.07667369 –0.17190381
SSW 3.5 3.6 3.6 –4.7 –4.4 –7.2
With 0.0001509 0.0001481 0.0001460 –0.08454737 –0.07632455 –0.17314054
SSW 3.9 3.9 3.9 –4.6 –4.3 –7.1
Option Value Peak Value
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without –0.00023237 –0.00020934 –0.00024276 –0.0012644 –0.00107072 –0.00292954
SSW –5.5 –5.0 –5.5 –3.8 –3.2 –5.7
With –0.00030332 –0.00027806 –0.0003286 –0.00126031 –0.00105993 –0.00293449
SSW –6.1 –5.6 –6.2 –3.7 –3.2 –5.7
Source: GSOEP, working sample of men, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/gsoep).
Note: Numbers in italics are ∂P/∂x and t-statistics.
Table 5.8 Goodness of Fit (males)
Accrual Rate Tax Rate
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without SSW –1530.1362 –1524.0716 –1492.562 –1532.5654 –1529.0165 –1481.4323
18.2 18.6 20.2 18.1 18.3 20.8
With SSW –1528.6764 –1522.7746 –1491.2561 –1532.5653 –1529.0016 –1481.3642
18.3 18.6 20.3 18.1 18.3 20.8
Option Value Peak Value
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without SSW –1527.4082 –1525.2906 –1490.2695 –1536.2424 –1533.1139 –1488.696
18.4 18.5 20.3 17.9 18.1 20.4
With SSW –1522.938 –1521.7785 –1485.3395 –1536.2335 –1533.0664 –1488.6922
18.6 18.7 20.6 17.9 18.1 20.4
Source: GSOEP, working sample of men, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/gsoep).
Note: Percentages in italics are log-likelihood values and pseudo R2.
Table 5.11 Marginal Eﬀect of Incentive Variables (females)
Accrual Rate Tax Rate
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without 0.0000087 0.0000115 0.0000046 –0.01152618 –0.01250953 –0.01550037
SSW 0.7 0.8 0.3 –2.8 –2.4 –1.9
With 0.0000074 0.0000102 0.0000037 –0.01180793 –0.01278009 –0.01608508
SSW 0.6 0.7 0.2 –2.7 –2.3 –1.8
Option Value Peak Value
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without –0.00005129 –0.00006159 –0.00010106 –0.00133364 –0.00159996 –0.00270272
SSW –3.4 –3.1 –3.1 –5.1 –5.0 –4.2
With –0.00005499 –0.00006957 –0.00013015 –0.00155703 –0.00189241 –0.00384073
SSW –3.7 –3.4 –3.7 –5.2 –5.1 –4.6
Source: GSOEP, working sample of men, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/gsoep).
Note: Numbers in italics are ∂P/∂x and t-statistics.
Table 5.10 Goodness of Fit (females)
Accrual Rate Tax Rate
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without –691.58206 –684.4851 –632.7585 –687.97887 –681.87265 –631.03328
SSW 18.0 18.9 24.9 18.4 19.2 25.1
With –691.28715 –684.2648 –632.60559 –687.95991 –681.86189 –631.01395
SSW 18.1 18.9 25.0 18.4 19.2 25.1
Option Value Peak Value
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Without –685.97528 –679.93327 –627.72675 –678.58724 –672.18414 –623.80517
SSW 18.7 19.4 25.5 19.6 20.3 26.0
With –684.17131 –678.30671 –625.19017 –677.54142 –671.08436 –621.56825
SSW 18.9 19.6 25.8 19.7 20.4 26.3
Source: GSOEP, working sample of men, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/gsoep).
Note: Percentages in italics are log-likelihood values and pseudo R2.
being retired when the incentive variable is changed infinitesimally. Tables
5.12 and 5.13 show full regression results for our favorite specification (op-
tion value with SSW and with a full set of age dummies). The other specifi-
cations produce very similar results in terms of significance and signs.
Using tax rate and peak value yield significantly better fits than accrual
rate and option value in almost all specifications. There is little diﬀerence
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Table 5.12 Probit Estimates for Male Subsample—Incentive Variable OV
dF /dx SE z P 	 z x-bar 95% C.I.
OPTVAL –.003053 .0000485 –6.07 0.000 249.725 –.0004 –.00021
FSSW –.0001714 .0000361 –4.67 0.000 316.764 –.000242 –.000101
AGEDUM55* –.0035989 .0146005 –0.24 0.810 .137001 –.032215 .025018
AGEDUM56* .0171014 .0172827 1.09 0.275 .133765 –.016772 .050975
AGEDUM57* .0283252 .0191398 1.72 0.086 .123902 –.009188 .065838
AGEDUM58* .03864 .0213393 2.20 0.028 .111111 –.003184 .080464
AGEDUM59* .0422839 .0230766 2.26 0.024 .096933 –.002945 .087513
AGEDUM60* .1134217 .0357241 4.60 0.000 .081368 .043404 .18344
AGEDUM61* .1363814 .0140872 4.97 0.000 .062567 .055852 .216911
AGEDUM62* .112833 .0408826 4.05 0.000 .045307 .032704 .192961
AGEDUM63* .1994108 .0552118 5.69 0.000 .033595 .091198 .307624
AGEDUM64* .4444502 .0744151 8.93 0.000 .022346 .298599 .590301
AGEDUM65* .3689588 .0861118 6.71 0.000 .01125 .200183 .537735
AGEDUM66* .7122481 .084577 8.69 0.000 .006164 .540834 .883662
AGEDUM67* .4784933 .2128542 3.34 0.001 .001079 .061307 .89568
AGEDUM68* .3776805 .2945118 2.03 0.042 .00616 –.199552 .954913
AGEDUM71* .6680958 .3101597 2.53 0.012 .000308 .060194 1.276
HEALTH –.0101493 .0009479 –11.65 0.000 9.07096 –.012007 –.008292
MARRIED* –.0076327 .0119856 –0.68 0.498 .95161 –.031124 .015859
UNI* –.027545 .007122 –2.96 0.003 .128833 –.041504 –.013586
SKILL .0029414 .0058029 0.51 0.612 .869934 –.008432 .014315
VEIGEN* .0062658 .0050534 1.24 0.216 .53059 –.003639 .01617
VNULL* –.0050004 .0078429 –0.61 0.541 .087225 –.020372 .010371
VWP* .0156084 .0067196 2.51 0.012 .229619 .002438 .028779
VPDAUER .0001696 .001485 0.11 0.909 38.3005 –.002741 .00308
VPDAUER2 –3.57e-06 .0000249 –0.14 0.886 1521.28 –.000052 .000045
YHAT .0012985 .0003284 3.92 0.000 59.9149 .000655 .001942
YHAT2 2.80e-06 5.51e-07 4.95 0.000 4499.21 1.7e-06 3.9e-06
ds* –.022587 .0057826 –3.13 0.002 .107104 –.033921 –.011253
db* .0464132 .0141686 4.14 0.000 .093389 .018643 .074183
KIDS* –.0075237 .0048206 –1.55 0.122 .419171 –.016972 .001925
Obs. P .0826013
Pred. P .0412237 (at x-bar)
No. of obs. = 6,489
LR 2 (31) = 870.62
Prob 	 2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.2353
Log-likelihood = –1414.5558
Source: GSOEP, working sample of men, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/gsoep).
Note: An asterisk denotes dummy variables.
between including SSW or not, although introducing age dummies makes
a large diﬀerence. Judging from the goodness of fit, the regression with age
dummies but without SSW, is our favorite specification. The pseudo R2 is
just about 20 percent, a satisfactory but not excellent value.
All incentive variables have the correct sign and are highly significant.
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Table 5.13 Probit Estimates for Female Subsample—Incentive Variable OV
dF /dx SE z P 	 z x-bar 95% C.I.
OPTVAL –.0001008 .0000657 –3.54 0.000 157.169 –.000229 .000028
FSSW –.0000474 .0000351 –2.13 0.033 118.39 –.000116 .000021
AGEDUM55* –.000499 .0044412 –0.11 0.912 .152008 –.009204 .008206
AGEDUM56* .0009751 .0049257 0.21 0.835 .137986 –.008679 .010629
AGEDUM57* –.0006681 .0043968 –0.15 0.882 .12747 –.009286 .00795
AGEDUM58* .0002302 .0047638 0.05 0.961 .114404 –.009107 .009567
AGEDUM59* .0042321 .0073449 0.78 0.434 .100064 –.010164 .018628
AGEDUM60* .0606805 .0448888 4.97 0.000 .079987 –.0273 .148661
AGEDUM61* .1375386 .0839864 6.78 0.000 .051307 –.027072 .302149
AGEDUM62* .0385825 .0360184 2.92 0.003 .028043 –.032012 .109177
AGEDUM63* .0209055 .0247693 1.79 0.074 .02167 –.027641 .069241
AGEDUM64* .0712695 .0611771 3.48 0.001 .015296 –.048636 .191174
AGEDUM65* .2828068 .1450685 6.64 0.000 .011791 –.001522 .567136
AGEDUM66* .4289469 .2050834 5.55 0.000 .004461 .026991 .830903
AGEDUM67* .0305762 .0538137 1.08 0.279 .002231 –.074897 .136049
AGEDUM69* –.0046263 .0085027 –0.40 0.691 .001912 –.021291 .012039
AGEDUM70* .010992 .0402127 0.40 0.690 .000956 –.067823 .089808
AGEDUM71* .017278 .0628126 0.44 0.662 .000637 –.105832 .140388
HEALTH –.0018635 .001441 –4.52 0.000 9.42065 –.004688 .000961
MARRIED* –.028244 .0195633 –4.46 0.000 .950605 –.066587 .010099
UNI* –.0063273 .0056794 –1.53 0.126 .035692 –.017459 .004804
SKILL –.005533 .004353 –2.82 0.005 .476099 –.014065 .002999
VEIGEN* –.0005057 .0019191 –0.27 0.786 .515934 –.004267 .003256
VNULL* –.0016109 .0028384 –0.58 0.561 .108987 –.007174 .003952
VWP* .0013406 .0026261 0.56 0.575 .202996 –.003806 .006488
VPDAUER .0001974 .0003477 0.67 0.504 20.1118 –.000484 .000879
VPDAUER2 –3.72e-06 6.74e-06 –0.63 0.529 558.3 –.000017 9.5e-06
YHAT .0009701 .0005632 3.97 0.000 28.7974 –.000134 .002074
YHAT2 –2.41e-06 6.26e-07 –2.02 0.043 6598 –3.6e-06 –1.2e-06
ds* –.006747 .0053123 –2.66 0.008 .089229 –.016887 .003937
db* .0410058 .0534307 1.63 0.103 .007967 –.063716 .145728
KIDS* .0007423 .0021086 0.36 0.717 .345124 –.00339 .004875
Obs. P .0761632
Pred. P .0080778 (at x-bar)
No. of obs. = 3,138
LR 2 (31) = 462.90
Prob 	 2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.2739
Log-likelihood = –613.60367
Source: GSOEP, working sample of men, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/gsoep).
Note: An asterisk denotes dummy variables.
They are very robust across all the diﬀerent specifications, including inclu-
sion of other covariates, sample selection, and definition of retirement (not
shown in table). Including age dummies yields larger marginal eﬀects and
better precision, while including SSW has a very small weakening eﬀect.
The estimation sample also includes civil servants. We have pro-
grammed the incentive variables for civil servants using the pension rules
for civil servants, which should lead to stronger incentives for early retire-
ment. However, estimates for a sample of civil servants only are disap-
pointing. The most probable reason is that we do not capture the incentives
created by promotion possibilities, the main reason for civil servants to re-
tire later than measured by our incentive variables.
Turning to the female sample, results are much weaker than for males.
While the overall fit is comparable and sometimes even better, the incentive
variables are very weak. Only option value and peak value are significant,
with one incorrect sign for peak value in the specification with SSW and
linear age. Table 5.12 shows the full regression results for our favorite spec-
ification in the full sample.
The incentive variable (here, option value) is highly significant as
pointed out before. The set of age dummies is also highly significant and
elevates the probabilities to retire after ages sixty, sixty-three, and sixty-
five, the earliest retirement ages under the various pathways (see table 5.1).
There clearly is an independent eﬀect of age and the incentive variable on
retirement. Self-reported health is also highly significant: Healthier work-
ers retire substantially later than those males who report poor health. Mar-
ried males do not have a diﬀerent retirement behavior than single males.
However, if there is (still) a child in the household retirement is more likely
to be deferred. The eﬀect of a college degree on retirement age is very
strong and is present although we have an income measure (yhat and yhat2)
as an additional control. The wealth variables indicate that there is a
wealth eﬀect, also weak and barely significant: Persons with higher wealth
(indicated by homeownership and financial assets) can aﬀord an earlier re-
tirement. Also, higher labor income weakens labor force attachment. Note
that the higher opportunity costs of retirement have already been ac-
counted for in the option value variable, and hence, this income eﬀect is
over and above this plus the wealth eﬀect. Two dummy variables indicate
the former labor force status. These variables take the value of 1 if the per-
son is actually or used to be a self-employed or a civil servant. The model
indicates that the self-employed tend to work longer, while civil servants re-
tire earlier. Both result confirm our expectations.
The peaks of the age dummies are now much more pronounced at age
sixty and sixty-five, in accordance with the diﬀerent rules for women. Most
socioeconomic variables have similar (but weaker) eﬀects compared with
the male sample. Diﬀerent, however, is the eﬀect of being married: Married
women retire later, probably because they have raised children and there-
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fore have an interrupted earnings record such that they are not yet eligible
for retirement at age sixty.
5.6 Simulation Results
We now apply the estimated coeﬃcients to several simulation experi-
ments. We first simulate reforms that are close to what happened in Ger-
many in the 1992 reform and what the next reform step may strengthen:
shifting the retirement age up by making the system more actuarially fair.
Second, we simulate several reforms not specific to Germany and unlikely
to happen, but which are used to compare the retirement incentive eﬀects
across the countries represented in this volume.
5.6.1 Reform Options Specific to Germany
The first country-specific experiment shows what is likely to happen
when the 1992 reform is fully phased in. The experiment applies the ad-
justment factors for early retirement that have been introduced by the pen-
sion reform 1992 (3.6 percent per year of early retirement) and compares
it to the previous situation without any explicit adjustments. The 1992 ad-
justment factors have been phased in after our sample period and will take
full force from the year 2004 onward. They are not actuarial fair, and they
are not eﬀective before age sixty because they are overruled by the special
earnings-point credits given under disability insurance.
The second country-specific experiment goes one step further and in-
troduces a geometric adjustment of 6 percent per year that comes closer to
a actuarially fair adjustment. The experiment can therefore be thought of
as a preview of a potential pension reform after the 2002 elections. It is
applied to all ages in the window period (ages fifty-four to sixty-nine), an-
chored at the pivotal retirement age of sixty-five.
For each policy scenario we use the estimated parameter values in order
to compute the probability to retire at age x given that the worker has
worked until age fifty-three. We first display the baseline probabilities (i.e.,
predicted under the pension rules of 1972 valid in our sample period). We
then predicted probabilities under the hypothetical new rules (see figures
5.5 and 5.6 based on a specification with age and age squared, rather than
linear age or a set of age dummies). The figures show the shift to the right
of the distribution, resulting in an increase of the average retirement age.
This resulting increase in retirement age is displayed in table 5.14. It
amounts to eight months for the 1992 reform, and seventeen months for a
system that is almost actuarially fair. Given that the average retirement age
is about sixty years in 1999 for German males, the adjustment factor of 6
percent would imply an increase of the retirement age to sixty-one-and-
one-half years for males. The impact of such a reform on the budget of the
PAYG system would be considerable. Given that the average duration of
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pension receipts was sixteen years prior to the reform, expenditure would
decrease by roughly 10 percent through this eﬀect. A second eﬀect works
through the extended working life, which leads to higher contributions.
Two additional years, relative to forty service years, increase the contribu-
tions to the PAYG system by 5 percent—provided that deferred take-up of
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Fig. 5.5 Baseline and predicted distribution of retirement ages (1992 reform)
Source: GSOEP, working sample of males, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/
gsoep).
Fig. 5.6 Baseline and predicted distribution of retirement ages (fair system)
Source: GSOEP, working sample of males, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/
gsoep).
pensions implies additional employment. Moreover, there is a third bud-
getary eﬀect (compared to the no-reform case) since pension benefits are
now lower for all who retire early. This would save another 18 percent.
5.6.2 Simulations for Cross-National Comparisons
This second set of simulations serves as a vehicle for an extensive cross-
national comparison of the eﬀects that the early retirement incentives ex-
ert on retirement behavior. We use two hypothetical reform scenarios (the
“three-year-shift reform” and the “common reform,” later explained in
more detail) and apply them systematically to several variants of our esti-
mated models of retirement. These variants include the option value and
the peak value model, each of which is estimated using a linear and a
dummy-variable age specification. In the latter case and in combination
with the three-year-shift reform, we introduce yet another two variants:
one for keeping the dummy variables at their original ages and one for shift-
ing them along with the shift in the incentive variables. These latter variants
are designed to bracket possible behavioral eﬀects that are embedded in the
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Table 5.14 Eﬀects of Policy Reforms on Expected Retirement Age
With SSW Without SSW
Age Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Simulation A (1992 Reform), Men
Accrual rate –0.10 –0.10 –0.09 0.41 0.34 0.72
Tax rate –0.12 –0.12 –0.11 0.41 0.34 0.73
Option value 1.90 1.74 1.55 0.39 0.32 0.73
Peak value 2.31 2.16 1.86 0.39 0.31 0.73
Simulation B (6% Geometric Adjustment Factors), Men
Accrual rate –0.10 –0.10 –0.09 0.91 0.79 1.57
Tax rate –0.12 –0.12 –0.11 0.91 0.79 1.58
Option value 2.63 2.45 2.12 1.11 0.93 1.85
Peak value 3.06 2.91 2.39 1.11 0.93 1.85
Simulation A (1992 Reform), Women
Accrual rate –0.02 –0.02 –0.01 0.12 0.08 0.08
Tax rate –0.02 –0.02 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.09
Option value 1.01 0.89 0.77 0.42 0.26 0.40
Peak value 1.42 1.28 1.18 0.46 0.27 0.52
Simulation B (6% Geometric Adjustment Factors), Women
Accrual rate –0.02 –0.02 –0.01 0.33 0.25 0.19
Tax rate –0.02 –0.02 0.00 0.34 0.26 0.20
Option value 1.48 1.32 1.14 1.32 1.05 1.13
Peak value 1.98 1.80 1.62 1.41 1.10 1.36
Source: GSOEP, working sample of men, 1984–1997 (available at http://www.diw-berlin.de/
gsoep).
age dummies; for a particular example, the habitual eﬀects associated with
age sixty-five as a psychological anchor for retirement decisions.
The three-year-shift reform increases the ages of early and normal re-
tirement by three years (and the corresponding adjustment factors, if ap-
plicable) from the current age in the countries represented by this study.
The common reform changes all national systems to a common system
with an early retirement age of sixty years, a normal retirement age of
sixty-five years, a 60 percent replacement rate at age sixty-five, and a 6 per-
cent per year actuarial adjustment, pivoted at age sixty-five.
In the following set of figures, we show all our results both in terms of
hazard rates (left-side panels) and the cumulative distribution function (in-
verse survival function, right-side panels). For convenience, the hazard
rates are also tabulated in the appendix. We summarize our results in table
5.15 which displays the expected average retirement ages for all simulations.
Figure 5.7 shows the fit of the option versus the peak value model used
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Table 5.15 Expected Retirement Age
Men Women
Sample
Sample frequencies 61.77 61.89
Base Simulation
Option value model
Linear age 62.01 62.02
Dummies 61.79 61.89
Peak value model
Linear age 62.01 62.02
Dummies 61.79 61.90
Three-Year-Shift Simulation
Option value model
Linear age 63.52 64.50
Dummies fixed 63.55 64.21
Dummies shifted 65.52 66.23
Peak value model
Linear age 62.65 62.34
Dummies fixed 62.46 62.55
Dummies shifted 65.04 65.16
Common Reform Simulation
Option value model
Linear age 64.31 62.64
Dummies fixed 64.17 62.60
Dummies changed 63.55 64.21
Peak value model
Linear age 63.56 62.32
Dummies fixed 63.30 62.51
Dummies changed 62.46 62.55
Note: Expected value is taken over distribution truncated at age 69.
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in these simulations. With a linear age specification, the peak value model
slightly underestimates retirement at age sixty-five, but in the other ages the
two models are very close. They deliver, of course, identical simulations
with a full set of dummy variables for each age since in this case the model
is fully saturated. Table 5.15 shows the variation among the four models in
terms of expected retirement age and how closely the match the actual re-
tirement age.
Figure 5.8 summarizes all simulations. Focusing on the cumulative re-
tirement function, the three-year-shift reform is much more incisive for
German men than the common reform, since the common reform keeps
the current early retirement age as well as the normal retirement age un-
changed. The common reform lowers the replacement rate from currently
around 70 percent by 10 percentage points. This actually has very little
eﬀects on retirement age. The shift seen in figure 5.8 is mainly an eﬀect of
changing the actuarial adjustments and therefore closely corresponds to
what we have seen in simulation B in the previous subsection. The eﬀects
are more complicated for women. Women have an earlier retirement age
(sixty rather than sixty-three), so that the common reform has an even
larger eﬀect on women than on men. However, the early retirement age ap-
plies only to women with thirty-five years of service. For women with an in-
terrupted work history, the reform has little eﬀect at all because they are re-
stricted to enter retirement at age sixty-five anyway.
Figure 5.8 also shows that the option value model generally predicts
larger eﬀects than the peak value model. This diﬀerence is isolated in fig-
ure 5.9. As seen by the hazard rates, the option value model has a more
subtle pattern of peaks than the peak value model, which does not really
capture the in-between-peak at age sixty-three.
Another eye-catching diﬀerence in figure 5.8 stems from the impact of
shifting the dummies as an approximation of the eﬀect, by which all age-
specific behavior is shifted by three years. Figure 5.10 isolated these diﬀer-
ences for the three-year-shift reform and shows that this makes a huge
diﬀerence—by about two years concerning the expected retirement age.
While these two years are probably an exaggeration of the long-run impact
of a later retirement age, the short-run impact measured by keeping the
dummies in place is probably an underestimate.
We finish this paper by summarizing that a reform policy of changing the
actuarial adjustments, the early retirement ages, or both can indeed shift
the retirement age quite substantially. Considering the overall length of re-
tirement (which is currently about seventeen years in Germany), the orders
of magnitude—about two years for a set of feasible reform options—is
quite significant.
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Appendix
Table 5A.1 Sample Hazard Rates
Men Women
95% 95% 95% 95%
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Age N Mean SD Bound Bound N Mean SD Bound Bound
54 861 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.020 470 0.017 0.006 0.005 0.029
55 889 0.015 0.004 0.007 0.023 477 0.019 0.006 0.007 0.031
56 868 0.026 0.005 0.016 0.037 433 0.025 0.008 0.011 0.040
57 804 0.041 0.007 0.027 0.055 400 0.025 0.008 0.010 0.040
58 721 0.060 0.009 0.042 0.077 359 0.033 0.009 0.015 0.052
59 629 0.073 0.010 0.053 0.094 314 0.051 0.012 0.026 0.075
60 528 0.155 0.016 0.124 0.186 251 0.219 0.026 0.168 0.271
61 406 0.185 0.019 0.147 0.223 161 0.348 0.038 0.273 0.422
62 294 0.146 0.021 0.106 0.187 88 0.159 0.039 0.081 0.237
63 218 0.225 0.028 0.169 0.281 68 0.103 0.037 0.029 0.177
64 145 0.428 0.041 0.346 0.509 48 0.188 0.057 0.073 0.302
65 73 0.315 0.055 0.206 0.424 37 0.486 0.083 0.318 0.655
66 40 0.700 0.073 0.552 0.848 14 0.643 0.133 0.356 0.930
67 7 0.429 0.202 –0.066 0.923 7 0.286 0.184 –0.166 0.737
68 4 0.250 0.250 –0.546 1.046 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
69 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6 0.167 0.167 –0.262 0.595
70 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 0.333 0.333 –1.101 1.768
71 2 0.500 0.500 –5.853 6.853 2 0.500 0.500 –5.853 6.853
72 1 0.000 • • • 0 • • • •
73 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 • • • •
74 1 0.000 • • • 0 • • • •
75 0 • • • • 0 • • • •
Note: N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation. Dots indicate observations.
Table 5A.2 Base Case: Empirical and Simulated Hazard Rates (men)
Option Value Model Peak Value Model
Age Sample Linear Dummies Linear Dummies
53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
54 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.012
55 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.014
56 0.026 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.026
57 0.041 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.041
58 0.060 0.064 0.059 0.059 0.059
59 0.073 0.100 0.076 0.088 0.075
60 0.155 0.141 0.156 0.136 0.156
61 0.185 0.182 0.181 0.181 0.182
62 0.146 0.211 0.145 0.218 0.145
63 0.225 0.258 0.225 0.285 0.255
64 0.428 0.289 0.427 0.323 0.426
65 0.315 0.310 0.316 0.280 0.326
66 0.700 0.412 0.698 0.356 0.692
67 0.429 0.424 0.425 0.437 0.426
68 0.250 0.379 0.239 0.447 0.234
69 0.000 0.507 0.000 0.537 0.000
70 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.540 0.000
71 0.500 0.550 0.500 0.623 0.500
72 0.000 0.671 0.000 0.717 0.000
Table 5A.3 Three-Year-Shift Reform: Simulated Hazard Rates (men)
Option Value Model Peak Value Model
Age Linear Dummies Shifted Linear Dummies Shifted
53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
54 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.013 0.013
55 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.016 0.014 0.014
56 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.024 0.028 0.012
57 0.013 0.012 0.006 0.039 0.042 0.014
58 0.023 0.018 0.008 0.059 0.059 0.015
59 0.036 0.022 0.015 0.087 0.073 0.035
60 0.050 0.046 0.017 0.107 0.080 0.034
61 0.077 0.065 0.025 0.146 0.096 0.049
62 0.097 0.052 0.025 0.179 0.072 0.051
63 0.142 0.106 0.065 0.237 0.120 0.088
64 0.179 0.265 0.074 0.284 0.304 0.094
65 0.222 0.211 0.065 0.328 0.475 0.075
66 0.274 0.517 0.112 0.400 0.805 0.117
67 0.265 0.240 0.224 0.351 0.203 0.187
68 0.252 0.131 0.129 0.363 0.092 0.313
69 0.387 0.000 0.482 0.465 0.000 0.674
70 0.364 0.000 0.196 0.455 0.000 0.149
71 0.493 0.432 0.179 0.559 0.316 0.077
72 0.617 0.000 0.000 0.649 0.000 0.000
Table 5A.4 Common Reform: Simulated Hazard Rates (men)
Option Value Model Peak Value Model
Age Linear Dummies Shifted Linear Dummies Shifted
53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
54 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.013
55 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.017 0.015 0.014
56 0.016 0.018 0.009 0.026 0.034 0.028
57 0.026 0.026 0.012 0.040 0.047 0.042
58 0.041 0.035 0.018 0.060 0.064 0.059
59 0.062 0.042 0.022 0.085 0.071 0.073
60 0.086 0.088 0.046 0.099 0.068 0.080
61 0.137 0.130 0.065 0.139 0.088 0.096
62 0.187 0.123 0.052 0.175 0.069 0.072
63 0.269 0.238 0.106 0.241 0.127 0.120
64 0.341 0.497 0.265 0.293 0.333 0.304
65 0.401 0.426 0.211 0.353 0.524 0.475
66 0.456 0.741 0.517 0.421 0.847 0.805
67 0.398 0.394 0.240 0.404 0.331 0.203
68 0.350 0.209 0.131 0.410 0.147 0.092
69 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.525 0.000 0.000
70 0.539 0.000 0.000 0.626 0.000 0.000
71 0.602 0.564 0.432 0.689 0.690 0.316
72 0.724 0.000 0.000 0.781 0.000 0.000
Table 5A.5 Base Case: Empirical and Simulated Hazard Rates (women)
Option Value Model Peak Value Model
Age Sample Linear Dummies Linear Dummies
53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
54 0.017 0.011 0.016 0.013 0.016
55 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.018
56 0.025 0.028 0.024 0.026 0.024
57 0.025 0.043 0.024 0.040 0.024
58 0.033 0.067 0.033 0.059 0.032
59 0.051 0.095 0.052 0.079 0.051
60 0.219 0.137 0.221 0.150 0.222
61 0.348 0.16 0.346 0.179 0.346
62 0.159 0.200 0.160 0.215 0.162
63 0.103 0.229 0.105 0.250 0.107
64 0.188 0.257 0.185 0.280 0.186
65 0.486 0.324 0.488 0.256 0.486
66 0.643 0.377 0.644 0.262 0.645
67 0.286 0.523 0.303 0.561 0.313
68 0.000 0.634 0.000 0.640 0.000
69 0.167 0.681 0.180 0.704 0.167
70 0.333 0.822 0.337 0.873 0.337
71 0.500 0.905 0.500 0.942 0.500
72 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 5A.6 Three-Year-Shift Reform: Simulated Hazard Rates (women)
Option Value Model Peak Value Model
Age Linear Dummies Shifted Linear Dummies Shifted
53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
54 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.017 0.017
55 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.021 0.019 0.019
56 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.028 0.026 0.016
57 0.022 0.009 0.009 0.041 0.025 0.017
58 0.034 0.011 0.010 0.060 0.033 0.018
59 0.049 0.017 0.013 0.081 0.052 0.029
60 0.072 0.099 0.013 0.093 0.111 0.019
61 0.098 0.198 0.015 0.120 0.212 0.024
62 0.135 0.082 0.028 0.155 0.083 0.044
63 0.167 0.05 0.121 0.187 0.050 0.110
64 0.204 0.123 0.221 0.225 0.116 0.205
65 0.283 0.421 0.101 0.272 0.518 0.067
66 0.310 0.544 0.058 0.285 0.691 0.030
67 0.401 0.134 0.220 0.346 0.057 0.111
68 0.488 0.000 0.622 0.410 0.000 0.541
69 0.580 0.071 0.781 0.511 0.023 0.794
70 0.762 0.217 0.312 0.683 0.056 0.126
71 0.870 0.391 0.000 0.814 0.136 0.000
72 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 5A.7 Common Reform: Simulated Hazard Rates (women)
Option Value Model Peak Value Model
Age Linear Dummies Shifted Linear Dummies Shifted
53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
54 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.017
55 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.019
56 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.012 0.026
57 0.013 0.004 0.009 0.022 0.010 0.025
58 0.021 0.005 0.011 0.032 0.012 0.033
59 0.034 0.010 0.017 0.048 0.022 0.052
60 0.053 0.067 0.099 0.081 0.092 0.111
61 0.074 0.145 0.198 0.104 0.177 0.212
62 0.108 0.058 0.082 0.135 0.065 0.083
63 0.138 0.037 0.054 0.161 0.036 0.050
64 0.175 0.096 0.123 0.193 0.086 0.116
65 0.259 0.380 0.420 0.271 0.515 0.518
66 0.268 0.471 0.544 0.277 0.675 0.691
67 0.346 0.090 0.134 0.325 0.048 0.057
68 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.000
69 0.516 0.041 0.071 0.467 0.015 0.023
70 0.688 0.126 0.217 0.592 0.024 0.056
71 0.818 0.277 0.391 0.717 0.062 0.136
72 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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